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LABOR LAW: THE CONTROL FUNCTION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELLIOTT H. GOLDSTEIN*
During the last decade the salient characteristic of the labor law
field has been its expansion from narrow considerations of interpreta-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act' and the actions of the agency
which administers it, the National Labor Relations Board,2 to broader
concerns. Among these broader concerns are the role of collective bar-
gaining in the public sector, new statutory requirements regarding oc-
cupational safety and health, employment discrimination and the
individual's relationship with the union.
During the nineteen seventies, a great proportion of United States
Supreme Court decisions in the labor law area have dealt directly with
issues reflecting these concerns. A relatively lesser proportion of opin-
ions have addressed these concerns when the primary issue related to
the courts' role in reviewing National Labor Relations Board deci-
sions.3 Because of the structure of the Act, the United States Courts of
Appeals have been given jurisdiction to review cases decided by the
Board.
4
This year, in the 1977-78 term, the Seventh Circuit was faced with
several complex and recurring issues both in interpreting the Act, and
in judging the Board's method of administering the Act. These issues
are: (1) what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of
collective bargaining in non-profit hospitals, colleges and universities,
and retail stores;5 (2) whether a union commits an unfair labor practice
under the Act when it pickets an armored-car service after the Board
has determined that the union cannot be certified as a bargaining agent
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., Case Western Reserve;
member of the Illinois Bar.
1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the
Act].
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
3. For a discussion of this phenomenon see B. Aaron, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme
Court, 1975-76 Term [1976] 92 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 311 (address to Annual Convention of
American Bar Association's Labor Law Section, August 1976).
4. National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
5. NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cit. 1978); Kendall College v. NLRB,
570 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1978); Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, Inc., 567 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977).
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under the Act;6 and (3) whether in-plant meal service prices are within
the purview of "other terms and conditions of employment" and, thus,
mandatory subjects for bargaining.
7
In all these areas, the Seventh Circuit exhibited a sensitivity to its
control function over the Board in the statutory scheme of the Act.
However, in at least one area, that of hospital unit determination, the
Seventh Circuit's view is probably not sufficiently sensitive to Board
expertise or the practical impact of the court's interpretation of the
mandate of the Act.
THE APPROPRIATE UNIT CASES
Determining appropriate units for collective bargaining is clearly
the function of the Board, and its decisions are deemed to be discre-
tionary judgments to be given great deference by reviewing courts.8
The principal developments in Board unit determinations in recent
years have occurred in three distinct areas: (1) health care institutions, 9
as a result of the extension of the Board's jurisdiction in the 1974
amendments to the Act;' 0 (2) private, not-for-profit colleges and uni-
versities, I as a result of a Board decision in 1970 to assert jurisdiction
over such institutions12 and (3) retail chain stores,' 3 where the Board
reversed its former position as to the inappropriateness of single-store
units and decided that such single-store units are presumptively appro-
6. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 344 v. NLRB (Purolator Security), 568 F.2d 12
(7th Cir. 1977).
7. Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1978).
8. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976), in pertinent part, declares
that:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof ....
The Supreme Court, in South Prarie Constr. Co. v. Local 627 Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
425 U.S. 800, 805 (1976) stated that "the selection of an appropriate bargaining unit lies largely
within the discretion of the Board, whose decision, 'if not final, is rarely to be disturbed'.
(quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947)).
9. See, e.g., NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978).
10. See National Labor Relations Act § 2(14) (as amended 1974), 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976),
which provides:
The term "health care institution" shall include any hospital, convalescent hospital,
health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or
other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm, or aged person.
11. See, e.g., Kendall College v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1978).
12. Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970) (where appropriate, the BNA
LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER MANUAL citations are provided for the convenience of the practi-
tioner).
13. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Chicago Health
& Tennis Clubs, Inc., 567 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977).
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priate under the Act.14 This year the Seventh Circuit had occasion to
review Board action in each of these areas.
How Broad Should a Unit be in Health Care Institutions?
In 1974, the Act was amended to cover the once exempt non-profit
health care institutions.'5 This amendment expansively defines cover-
age to include not just hospitals, but all "health care institutions."
"Congress removed the exemption because it 'could find no acceptable
reason why. . . employees of. . .non-profit, non-public hospitals...
should continue to be excluded from the coverage and protection of the
Act.' "16 During the hearings and debates leading to the passage of the
amendments, Congress was concerned that the welfare of hospital pa-
tients might be disrupted by proliferation of collective bargaining units
in health care institutions. This concern was reflected in the committee
reports of both Houses' 7 which admonished the Board that "[d]ue con-
sideration should be given by the Board to preventing proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry."' 8
In the first group of representation decisions under the new
amendments, the Board attempted to state general principles which
could be applied to later decisions.' 9 These decisions found permissi-
ble the following appropriate bargaining units in health care institu-
tions: (1) registered nurses;20 (2) all other professionals;21 (3) technicals,
including licensed practical nurses; 22 (4) business office clericals23 and
14. See Say-On Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962).
15. National Labor Relations Act § 2(14) (as amended 1974), 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976).
16. NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 214 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting S. REP. No.
766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); S. CONF. REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin
[19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3948).
17. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); S. CONF. REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3946, 3950. See NLRB v. West Subur-
ban Hosp., 570 F.2d at 214-15.
18. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); S. CONF. REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), repinied in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3950.
19. See Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1975); St.
Catherine's Hosp. of Dominican Sisters, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 787, 89 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1975); Barnert
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 89 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1975); Newington Children's Hosp.,
217 N.L.R.B. 793, 89 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1975); Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 217 N.L.R.B. 797, 89
L.R.R.M. 1082 (1975); Duke Univ., 217 N.L.R.B. 799, 89 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1975); Mt. Airy Foun-
dation, 217 N.L.R.B. 802, 89 L.R.R.M. 1067 (1975); Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 217
N.L.R.B. 806, 89 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1975).
20. Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1975).
21. Id.
22. Barnert Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 775, 89 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1975).
23. Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 89 L.R.R.M. 1097 (1975); Sisters of
St. Joseph of Peace, 217 N.L.R.B. 797, 89 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1975).
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(5) service and maintenance employees. 24
Thus, in NLRB v. West Suburban Hospital,25 the Seventh Circuit
was faced with the propriety of an NLRB determination that a unit of
certain service and maintenance employees was appropriate. The case
involved a group of twenty-one non-professional employees compris-
ing the hospital's maintenance department. The Board found that the
sole question was whether this group constituted a distinct and homo-
geneous unit whose employees share a community of interests. How-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not agree. The
court stated that "[tihe determination of an appropriate unit for collec-
tive bargaining purposes is [generally] committed to the informed dis-
cretion of the Board. . . . But the Board's discretionary powers with
respect to unit determination are not without limits .... "26 The court
concluded that the issue was not one of informed discretion but of the
application of the law. Hence, the appellate court had to decide
whether the Board's determination, that the hospital's maintenance de-
partment constituted an appropriate collective bargaining unit, con-
formed to the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the Act as a
matter of law.
In reviewing this case, the court observed that the Board unit de-
termination in West Suburban Hospital27 was contrary "to at least
eleven other similar bargaining unit cases," 28 and that the Board had
erroneously stressed the importance of the amount of time spent in the
maintenance area of the hospital. The court also concluded that the
Board had erred in considering whether the maintenance employees
were in contact with each other about fifty per cent of the time. The
Seventh Circuit pointed out that although common work stations, nu-
merous work contracts, and similar indicia of unique community of
interest are traditional factors used by the Board in the industrial sector
to make unit determinations, the stated congressional policy is to pre-
vent proliferation of bargaining units in this field. The key question,
therefore, should not have been whether the maintenance department
employees worked together at a common station. Rather, crucial scru-
tiny should have been applied in determining whether the twenty-one
maintenance employees had sufficient common relationships with the
other 359 non-professional employees to establish a community of in-
24. Newington Children's Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 793, 89 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1975); Shriners
Hosps. for Crippled Children, 217 N.L.R.B. 806, 89 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1975).
25. 570 F.2d 213, 214 (7th Cir. 1978).
26. Id. (citations omitted).
27. 224 N.L.R.B. 1369, 92 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1976).
28. NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d at 215.
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terests for the entire non-professional group.29 Thus, after reviewing
the facts, the Seventh Circuit found that:
[The] Board's mere lip-service mention of the Congressional admoni-
tion as a factor to be taken into account, without any indication from
the Board as to the manner in which its unit determination in this
case implemented or reflected that admonition,. . . the Board's deci-
sion violates the Congressional directive that "[djue consideration
should be given by the Board to preventing proliferation of bargain-
ing units in the health care field."
'30
In analyzing whether the Board action did indeed comport with
the Congressional mandate, the court relied upon Memorial Hospital of
Roxborough v. NLRB, 3 1 Long Island College Hospital v. NLRB 32 and
St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB. 33 In doing so, however, it misapplied
these decisions.
In Roxborough,34 a Board decision permitting a separate mainte-
nance department unit in a hospital was reversed. However, this re-
versal was not on the merits of the maintenance unit issue, but was
based on procedural grounds. Prior to adoption of the 1974 amend-
ment,35 the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board had exercised juris-
diction over a representative dispute and had determined that a
bargaining unit of maintenance employees, excluding the service de-
partment, was appropriate. When the 1974 amendment came into ef-
fect, the National Labor Relations Board pre-empted the state agency.
Nonetheless, the National Labor Relations Board extended comity to
the state agency's findings. The National Labor Relations Board thus
concluded that the employer's refusal to bargain with the employees'
representatives constituted unfair labor practices under sections 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act.
36
After an extended analysis of the law surrounding comity, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's grant of comity with respect to a deter-
mination of an appropriate bargaining unit was improper.37 The court
observed that the Board made the unit determination "without con-
ducting a hearing, without making findings of fact, and without evalu-
ating the facts of this case in light of the principles articulated in its
29. Id. at 215-16.
30. Id. at 216.
31. 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976).
32. 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977).
33. 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
34. 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977).
35. National Labor Relations Act § 2(14) (as amended 1974), 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976).
36. Memorial Hosp. of Roxborough, 220 N.L.R.B. 402, 90 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1975).
37. 545 F.2d at 360.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
prior decisions. ' 38 The court found that the Act requires the Board "to
exercise its discretion as to an appropriate unit in each and every
case." 3
9
Thus, any discussion in Roxborough of the import of the congres-
sional admonition against the proliferation of units in health care facil-
ities was clearly dictum. Moreover, the discussion in Roxborough does
not justify the expansive reading given it by the Seventh Circuit in West
Suburban Hospital.4° For example, the Third Circuit, while acknowl-
edging the congressional directive to the Board to avoid unit prolifera-
tion, notes that the "non-profit" amendments "do not create special
rules for bargaining unit determination in the health care industry."'41
It further suggests that the avoidance of proliferation of bargaining
units in health care facilities was only one of many factors to be consid-
ered by the Board.4 2
In deciding West Suburban Hospital, the Seventh Circuit also re-
lied on St. Vincent's Hospital v. NLRB.4 3 In St. Vincent's Hospital, the
Third Circuit again rejected a Board determination. The particular
determination before the court did not involve the maintenance depart-
ment but instead four boiler room operators, who the Board found
shared the requisite community of interests. The court, however, be-
lieved that this was an inappropriate unit in light of the congressional
intent to limit unit proliferation." The reasons proffered by the court
38. Id. at 357.
39. Id. at 360.
40. 570 F.2d 213.
41. 545 F.2d at 360.
42. Id. at 361. The court specificially stated:
This admonition against the proliferation of units in health care facilities was only to be
one of many factors to be considered by the Board. Senator Williams, chairman of the
Senate Committee which drafted the amendment and who was sponsor of the legislation,
explained the committee's intent as follows: "...The National Labor Relations Board
has shown good judgment in establishing appropriate units for the purposes of collective
bargaining, particularly n wrestling with units m newly covered dustries. While the
Board has, as a rule, tended to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of collective bargain-
ing units, sometimes circumstances require that there be a number of bargaining units
among nonsupervisory employees, particularly where there is a history in the area or a
notable disparity of interests between employees in different job classifications."
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 128 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1942)).
43. 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
44. In its discussion of the initial Board determination, the court recognized that the Board
had often deemed a unit of stationary engineers appropriate in the industrial sector. Id. at 592.
Further, the court recognized the Board's finding that there were several traditional factors present
that allowed licensed boiler operators to be grouped in a separate boiler room unit. These were
that all boiler room operators were licensed by the state, that they spent most of their time in the
boiler room where there was little contact with other hospital personnel and that there was little
interchange with other employees. However, the court decided that:
The legislative history of the health care amendments, however, makes it quite clear that
Congress directed the Board to apply a standard in this field that was not traditional.
Proliferation of units in industrial settings has not been the subject of congressional at-
tention but fragmentation in the health care field has aroused legislative apprehension.
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for rejecting this extremely small unit centered on the inappropriate-
ness of the boiler room unit, and not on an entire maintenance depart-
ment.45 Thus, St. Vincent's Hospital is clearly distinguishable from the
disputed unit determination which faced Seventh Circuit review in
West Suburban Hospital, and the Seventh Circuit's reliance on St. Vin-
cent's Hospital seems misplaced.
The last case relied on by the Seventh Circuit was Long Island
College Hospital v. NLRB,46 in which the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit was concerned with the impact of a prior
unit determination of a state labor agency. In this instance, the unit
was a maintenance unit which had been certified thirteen years earlier
by the state agency then having jurisdiction over the dispute. The
Board had declined to follow Roxborough, and instead had recognized
the thirteen-year-old certification, rather than making its own unit de-
termination and conducting an election. The court, speaking through
Judge Friendly, found the Board erred in not deciding anew the unit
issue.
In Long Island College Hospital, the court noted that the Board's
decisions are in a state of "disarray. ' 47  The Second Circuit did not,
however, reject the idea of a separate appropriate maintenance unit, as
the Seventh Circuit intimates. Rather, it specifically agreed with the
appropriateness of the Board's findings as to maintenance units. 48
However, the Second Circuit perceived the issue as one requiring a
Board hearing, and a resolution of the Board's vacillation over whether
maintenance and engineering units should be certified without service
employees.
The Board therefore should recognize that the contours of a bargaining unit in other
industries do not follow the blueprint Congress desired in a hospital.
Id.
45. "Id. at 592, 592-93 n.6. The court declared that:
[Tihe factors of amount of contact between workers, separate immediate supervision,
and the special skills of certain crafts must be put in balance against the public interest in
preventing fragmentation in the health care field. A mechanical reliance on traditional
patterns based on licensing, supervision, skills and employee joint activity simply does
not comply with congressional intent to treat this unique field in a special manner.
Id. at 592. Nonetheless, this comment reflects the court's concern over the boiler room issue, not
whether maintenance and service units are appropriate. The court does not indicate that mainte-
nance units are contrary to the congressional directive against proliferation.
46. 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977).
47. Id. at 844.
48. Id. at 843-44. See especially the court's discussion of the Board's posture that it can
grant either a maintenance unit or a service and maintenance unit, depending on the facts of each
case. Id. at 844. The court states that: "we agree with this conclusion. Moreover, the
preamendment NLRB health care cases cited favorably in the legislative history of the 1974
amendment do not call for a different result." Id. at 844 n.4.
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The decision in West Suburban Hospital is open to serious criti-
cism if it is intended as a statement that maintenance units in hospitals
are inappropriate because the congressional directive against prolifera-
tion of units in the health care field requires the Board to certify all
non-professionals as the smallest permissible unit. It is this writer's
contention that this is not the result Congress intended. 49 Moreover,
given the pyramid-like structure and organization of the highly role-
specialized, status-conscious health care industry, there are manifest
disadvantages in placing cooks, clerical employees, laboratory employ-
ees, aides, housekeepers and the maintenance personnel in a single
unit, while allowing professionals their separate units. At the fore-
front, such a requirement stands as a real impediment to the organizing
rights of the employees.
It may be that the Seventh Circuit was merely objecting to the
Board's failure to justify its finding in light of the congressional admo-
nition to limit the number of units. However, the court's use of the
comparison base of all non-professionals in analyzing the Board's ac-
tion indicates this is not the case. The court's analysis over-emphasizes
the importance of the non-proliferation factor and under-emphasizes
the role of Board expertise and discretion in unit determination deci-
sions. The Seventh Circuit should reconsider this position, in light of
the Board's assigned role in administering the Act.50
49. See text accompanying notes 41-42, supra.
50. For a well-reasoned discussion of the Board's role, see St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567
F.2d 588 (3d Cit. 1977) or Long Island College Hosp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1977).
In another major case interpreting the impact of the 1974 health care amendments to the Act,
the Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Swygert, supported a Board determination that a
hospital committed an unfair labor practice by promulgating a rule prohibiting employees from
soliciting union support or distributing union literature in all areas of the hospital to which pa-
tients and visitors have access. See Lutheran Hosp. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208
(7th Cir. 1977). The court noted that:
The primary function of a hospital is to provide health care, and the areas of a hospital
outside of immediate patient care areas are by definition not locations where the hospi-
tars primary function is carried out or where the public deals with the employees in their
profession capacity. Thus, while organizational activities conducted outside of imme-
diate patient care areas might create an abnormal atmosphere where they took place,
they would not interfere with the employees' job performance and therefore could not
disrupt the hospital's performance of its primary function.
Id. at 214.
This well-reasoned opinion attempted to accomodate the special needs of the health care
industry and employee organizational rights on premises. It specifically approved the Board's
decision in St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 91 L.R.R.M. 1333
(1976), enforcement granted inpart, denied inpart, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977), where the Board
determined that the balance should be struck to allow employee solicitation and distribution in
areas other than immediate patient care areas. Id. at 212-13. The court opined that further
litigation will be necessary to determine in exactly which areas of a hospital solicitation and distri-
bution may be forbidden as being immediate patient care areas.
The impact of this decision has been muted by the Supreme Court's June 20, 1978 decision in
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Unit Determination in Not-For-Profit Colleges and Universities
In Kendall College v. NLRB, 51 the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit enforced a Board determination that the composition of
the appropriate unit in a small, liberal arts college was all full-time
faculty and part-time faculty serving the college on a prorated contract
basis. The unit excluded all part-time faculty who teach at the college
on a per course appointment.
In 1970, in Cornell University,52 the Board reversed its long-stand-
ing refusal to assert jurisdiction over private non-profit institutions of
higher learning." The composition of appropriate units of profes-
sional employees at colleges and universities was later confronted by
the Board in Long Island University (C. W. Post Center),54 Long Island
University (Brooklyn Center)55 and University of New Haven, Inc.56 In
these cases, the Board held that the appropriate unit of professional
employees included both full-time professors and part-time instructors
and lecturers. This was consistent with its policy in the industrial sec-
tor, where regular part-time employees have been included in bargain-
ing units.57  However, in New York University,58 the Board reversed
itself and excluded all part-time faculty members from the faculty unit.
The Board stated, "We are now convinced that the differences between
the full-time and part-time faculty are so substantial in most colleges
and universities that we should not adhere to the principle announced
in the New Haven case." 59 The factors relied upon by the Board in this
major policy change were: (1) the differences in compensation; (2) the
lack of participation by part-time faculty in university governance; (3)
the unavailability of tenure for part-time faculty and (4) the differences
in working conditions. 60
In Kendall, the Seventh Circuit noted that the facts developed at
the representation hearing permitted the Board to reasonably differen-
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 98 S. Ct. 2463 (1978). In Beth Israel, the Court also supported the
Board's position for reasons similar to the Seventh Circuit's in Lutheran Hospital.
51. 570 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1978).
52. 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
53. In so doing, the Board took cognizance of the rapid growth in higher education since its
prior decision not to assert jurisdiction. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 29
L.R.R.M. 1098 (1951). In Cornell, the Board reexamined the legislative history of non-profit
organizations and potential coverage under the Act, and decided to assert its jurisdiction over
private colleges and universities.
54. 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
55. 189 N.L.R.B. 909, 77 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1971).
56. 190 N.L.R.B. 478, 77 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1971).
57. See Kendall College v. NLRB, 570 F.2d at 219.
58. 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973).
59. Id. at 6, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552.
60. Id. at 7, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552.
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tiate the status of part-time faculty. The court concluded that part-
time faculty with prorated contracts at Kendall shared a community of
interests with the full-time faculty. The court noted that part-time
faculty with contracts, received substantially higher compensation than
the per course instructors.6' Part-time faculty with contracts were re-
quired to have regular office hours and to participate in committee
work and faculty meetings. The general tenure freeze at Kendall Col-
lege made tenure status irrelevant. Moreover, a substantial portion of
the prorated contract faculty were dual function employees performing
administrative and counselling duties in addition to teaching. All
these factors increased their community of interest with the full-time
faculty.62 Essentially, the court found that the factual support allowed
the inclusion of one category of part-time instructors, those with pro-
rated contracts, and the exclusion of the per course instructors.
In enforcing the Board order, the court specifically rejected the ar-
gument of the college that all part-time faculty have a mutuality of
interests with their full-time colleagues. As the court stated:
Kendall contends that the New York University case and the Board's
subsequent decisions following it represent completely unprece-
dented Board action resulting in a per se rule, excluding part-time
faculty members from bargaining units. Kendall then asserts that
the application of the per se rule in this case constitutes an abuse of
discretion which will result in a Balkanization of bargaining units
and an imFairment of the rights of the excluded part-timers. We do
not agree. 
3
The court noted that the primary responsibility in making unit determi-
nations rests with the Board. Those determinations should not be
made on the basis of immutable or inflexible principles, however, "for
it must be remembered also that the adaptation of the Act to the
'changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.' "64
Thus, the court agreed with the Board's decision to base unit determi-
nations on the particular facts of each case and not on a slavish appli-
cation of general principles.
Single-Stores as Appropriate Units in Retail Store Chains
Board unit determinations for multi-store retail operations have
fluctuated in the Board's attempts to guarantee employee freedom of
choice while structuring an appropriate unit for bargaining. Until
1962, the chain-store position of the Board had been to follow the em-
61. Kendall College v. NLRB, 570 F.2d at 220.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 219.
64. Id. at 220 (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975)).
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ployer's administrative structure and deny single-store units when the
employing unit was larger.65 In Safeway Stores, Inc.,66 the Board
stated: "[A]bsent unusual circumstances, the appropriate collective bar-
gaining unit in the retail . . . trade should embrace all employees
within the categories sought who perform their work within the Em-
ployer's administrative division or [geographic] area."167
The presumption encompassing all retail stores within a geo-
graphic or administrative area was discarded in 1962 when the Board
decided its prior policy was not truly maximizing employee free choice
of a bargaining representative. Speaking of its earlier policy on unit
determinations in retail-chain cases, the Board in Say-On Drugs, Inc. 68
stated:
Reviewing our experience under [our prior] policy we believe that
too frequently it has operated to impede the exercise by employees in
retail-chain operations of their rights to self-organization guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act. In our opinion that policy has over-empha-
sized the administrative grouping of merchandising outlets at the ex-
pense of factors such as geographic separation of the several outlets
and the local managerial autonomy of the separate outlets; and it has
ignored completely as a factor the extent to which the claiming labor
organization had sought to organize the employees of the retail
chain. We have decided to modify this policy and to apply to retail-
chain operations the same unit policy which we apply to multi-plant
enterprises in general. Therefore, whether a proposed unit is con-
fined to one or two or more retail establishments making up an em-
ployer's retail-chain is appropriate will be determined in light of all
the circumstances of the case. 69
In Say-On Drugs, the retail chain was composed of nine drugstores
located in New York and New Jersey. The administration of the
chain, including that of labor-relations, was substantially centralized.
Despite this, the Board held that an election unit of all nonsupervisory
and non-professional employees in a single New Jersey drugstore was
appropriate.
In so finding, the Board emphasized the following: geographic sep-
aration of the store; substantial authority of the store manager; minimal
interchange of employees among the stores; absence of bargaining his-
tory on a broader basis and lack of any union-seeking representation
65. See NLRB v. Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, Inc., 567 F.2d 331, 335-36 nn.7-8 (7th Cir.
1977). See generally, R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 76-82 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
R. GORMA].
66. 96 N.L.R.B. 998, 28 L.R.R.M. 1622 (1951).
67. Id. at 1000, 28 L.R.R.M. at 1624.
68. 138 N.L.R.B. 1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962).
69. Id. at 1033, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
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on a broader basis.70
Two years later, in Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc. ,71 the Board am-
plified this change of policy when it decided that the single-store is
"presumptively appropriate unless it be established that the single plant
has been effectively merged into a more competitive unit so as to have
lost its individual identity. ' 72 However, the Seventh Circuit refused to
enforce the Board-ordered findings that such a single-store unit was
appropriate among the ten Big Boy restaurants in Indianapolis, Indi-
ana.73 After reviewing the record, the court found that the restaurants
were a single, integrated enterprise and that each restaurant lacked
sufficient autonomy even though the individual restaurant manager
could order supplies and merchandise and could independently hire
employees within centrally prescribed wage rates.74 The Seventh Cir-
cuit therefore reversed the Board and held that the employees in one
restaurant were not an appropriate bargaining unit.
However, in 1968 in Haag Drug Co.,75 the Board again applied its
"presumption." In that case the Board stated:
Our experience has led us to conclude that a single store in a retail-
chain, like single locations in multi location enterprises in other in-
dustries, is presumptively an appropriate unit for bargaining. In
cases subsequent to Say-On Drugs, we have consistently found such
units appropriate unless countervailing factors were present ... [T]o
draw a distinction between the single chain store and the single plant
in a multi plant enterprise or the insurance district office would artifi-
cially disadvantage the organizational interests of chain store em-
ployees, simply because their employer operates a chain rather than a
single store enterprise and would vest the chain operator with abso-
lute power alone to control the scope of the appropriate unit.
76
The propriety of the Board's presumption of single unit appropriate-
ness has produced fundamental disagreements among the circuit courts
of appeals both as to the scope of review of these determinations and as
to the deference to be given to the Board determination based on its
special expertise.
In NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc. ,77 the First Circuit noted that
70. Id. at 1034-35, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
71. 147 N.L.R.B. 551, 56 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1964), enforcement denied, 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir.
1966).
72. Id. at 551 n.1, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1247 n.1.
73. 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
74. Id. at 897. In so holding, the court said that: "It is evident to us that the decisions left to
the managers do not involve any significant element ofjudgment as to employment relations....
It is obvious to us that none of the store managers will be deciding questions affecting the employ-
ees in the context of collective bargaining." Id.
75. 169 N.L.R.B. 877, 67 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1968).
76. Id. at 877-78, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1290-91.
77. 376 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967).
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the independence of the stores "amounts to no more than a few miles of
physical separation and the consequent division of a few ministerial
responsibilities. '78 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Davis Cafe-
teria, Inc. 79 was concerned with whether the Board had abused its dis-
cretion in finding that two cafeterias of a chain of eight constituted an
appropriate bargaining unit. The court refused to approve the Board
finding, and quoted with approval the First Circuit opinion in ILRB v.
Purity Food Stores, Inc. 80
On the other hand, there is substantial judicial support in decisions
of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits for the point of view that the Board
must be given wide lattitude in representation bargaining unit determi-
nation. Thus, in NLRB v. Lerner Stores Corp. ,"t the court stated:
The Board is vested with a wide discretion in determining bargaining
units and it is not the province of the courts to displace the Board's
choice of a unit from among two or more appropriate units, even
though the court might have made a different choice with a case here
de novo .... Furthermore, in cases involving such chain stores, as
here, there is a presumption that a single store is an appropriate bar-
gaining unit.
82
With these decisions as background, the Seventh Circuit again
confronted the unit determination issue in Walgreen Co. v. NLRB. 83
In this case, the union had petitioned for a separate election in each of
twenty-seven individual Walgreen stores.84 Although these stores were
grouped administratively by Walgreen into eight districts, each consist-
ing of thirteen to nineteen stores, the Board found that the single-store
units were appropriate.8 5 The union won in eight of these elections.8 6
This case came before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
after the Board had issued an unfair labor practice order against Wal-
green for refusing to bargain with the union elected within the chal-
78. Id. at 501.
79. 396 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1968).
80. Id. at 20. But see NLRB v. Adams Drug Co., 414 F.2d 1194, 1202 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
In Adams the court noted that the Board now finds "presumptively appropriate" single-store units.
The court intimates that the Board so acts when a single-store is requested by the union as the
maximum extent of its organizational drive. 414 F.2d at 1201. In Adams, the court rejected the
Board's determination that a state-wide unit was appropriate, noting that the courts of appeals
"have not shrunk from their duty to refuse enforcement." 414 F.2d at 1201.
81. 506 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 707-08. For a concise summary of the Sixth Circuit's posture, see NLRB v. Lou
DeYoung's Mkt. Basket, Inc., 406 F.2d 17, 24 (6th Cir. 1969).
83. 564 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1977).
84. Id. at 752 n.l. Walgreen Co. owns approximately 124 stores in the Chicago metropolitan
area. Id. at 752.
85. Walgreen Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 548, 93 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1976); Walgreen Co., 226 N.L.R.B.
553, 93 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1976).
86. Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d at 752 n.l.
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lenged units.8 7
The court ruled that the Board's unit determination was reason-
able in light of all the facts presented, including the Board's crucial
determination that the individual store managers were substantially au-
tonomous and that there was an insubstantial amount of employee in-
terchange within the Walgreen administrative district.8 8  The court
noted the underlying Board presumption and that the presumption is
rebuttable. However, the court also noted the Board's position that in
order to rebut the presumption, there generally must be a coalescence
of several factors: geographic proximity of the stores; a lack of substan-
tial autonomy in the local store managers; substantial employee in-
terchange among stores in the chain and centralized management of
merchandise and operations.8 9
A fair reading of Walgreen would lead the observer to conclude
that the Board's unit determinations will be reviewed by the Seventh
Circuit only for abuse of discretion constituting arbitrariness, capri-
ciousness or unreasonableness. 90 The Walgreen decision itself con-
tained no language limiting the court's holding to the facts of this
particular case, nor any other indication that its holding should not be
applied to other unit determinations in the retail-chain setting.
Walgreen appeared to undercut the vitality of the Seventh Circuit's
1966 decision in NLRB Y. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc. 91
However, the court's decision in Walgreen did not foretell its later
decision in NLRB v. Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, Inc.92 In Chicago
Health Clubs, a consolidation of appeals by Saxon Paint Co. and the
Chicago Health Clubs, the court was presented with an issue identical
87. Id.
88. Id. at 754.
89. Id.
90. In determining that the Board had not abused its discretion, the Seventh Circuit noted
that since Congress has expressly delegated to the Board the authority to make unit determina-
tions, federal courts have long accorded special deference to the Board's conclusions. Moreover,
the court quoted the Supreme Court in its recent statement in South Prarie Constr. Co. v. Local
627 Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
The court interpreted South Prarie as containing an admonition which significantly limits the
scope of judicial review. The court also cited the general rule that the function of judicial review
of Board actions in the representation area is not to weigh evidence or overrule the exercise of
Board discretion, but to guarantee against arbitrary action by the Board. This general rule, the
court noted, was articulated in May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 380 (1945). The
court further noted that the general rule was recognized by the Seventh Circuit in State Farm
Mutua/Auto Ins. Co. v. NLB, 411 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832
(1969) and NLRB Y. Krieger-Ragsdale & Co., 379 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1041 (1968). 564 F.2d at 753. Thus, the court declined to find that the Board was arbitrary or
unreasonable in determining local managerial independence was sufficient to allow a single-store
unit determination.
91. 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966).
92. 567 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977).
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to the one in Walgreen: unit determination of the Board presented
under the guise of reviewing an employer's refusal to bargain with the
union elected within the challenged unit.93 The court reaffirmed its
statement in Walgreen that the primary responsibility for determining
the appropriateness of a unit for collective bargaining rests with the
Board.94 In Chicago Health Clubs, however, the court noted that al-
though Board determinations are subject to limited review, they are not
immune from judicial scrutiny.95 In supporting this view the Seventh
Circuit stated that the United States Supreme Court has held that
courts of review are not "'to stand aside and rubber stamp' Board de-
terminations that run contrary to the language or tenure of the Act."
96
Further, in Chicago Health Clubs the court discussed the scope of re-
view of Board decisions and noted the cases cited in Walgreen provid-
ing for review of discretion when it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious.97 The court also noted that NLRB v. Pinkerton's Inc. 98
provides for review of the Board determination and reversal where the
unit determinations are unsupported by substantial evidence. 99
The court, in Chicago Health Clubs, commented expansively on
the history of the Board's unit determinations in regard to multi-store
retail operations.l°° In analyzing the Board decisions, the court stated
that several decisions had suggested a weakening of the presumptive
appropriateness of single-store units. It noted the paradox that some
Board decisions seem impossible to reconcile.10'
The court stated that its job is to examine all of the factors used by
the Board in determining whether the single-store unit is appropri-
ate.' 02 In Chicago Health Clubs the court found that the Board had
based its unit determination for both Saxon Paint Co. and Chicago
Health Clubs largely on the role of the local store manager. In analyz-
ing the facts adduced to support the Board decision with regard to the
Saxon Paint stores, the court rejected the Board's finding that the store
managers had possessed autonomy and authority. The court also
found that all hiring, firing, training and similar labor-relation policy
decisions were not made by the local manager, but came from the cen-
93. Id. at 333.
94. Id. at 334-35.
95. Id. at 335.
96. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256 (1975)).
97. Id.
98. 416 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1969).
99. 567 F.2d at 335.
100. Id. at 332-33.
101. Id. at 335-36.
102. Id. at 335.
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tral office.' 0 3
In addition, Saxon Paint Co., unlike Walgreen Co., frequently
transferred its employees among the various Chicago area stores.104
There was also a history of collective bargaining at Saxon which re-
vealed that a larger unit than the single-store would be appropriate. 0 5
With regard to Saxon Paint, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
Board's request for enforcement and directed that the unfair labor
practice complaint based upon the refusal to deal with the elected
union be dismissed.l° 6 The court stated that it would not follow
Walgreen because "it is distinguishable both in the absence of bargain-
ing history and in the amount of autonomy exercised by the store man-
ager." 1
0 7
As to the decision regarding Chicago Health Clubs, the court
again weighed whether the Board's determination was based on sub-
stantial evidence and concluded that it was.' 0 8 Crucial to this was the
evidence on the record showing a complete absence of bargaining his-
tory; the proof that the extent of employee interchange among the vari-
ous clubs had been minimal; the difference in the types of health clubs
(there are at least three different types of clubs) and the convincing
proof that each Chicago Health Club manager had exercised a genu-
inely autonomous role. t9
The effect of Chicago Health Clubs is to revive the efficacy of
Frisch's. A major difficulty in reconciling the Seventh Circuit's opin-
ion in Walgreen with Chicago Health Clubs and Frisch's is understand-
ing how the court in each instance used different standards of review.
In Walgreen, the court interpreted its role as merely to control abuse of
discretion or arbitrariness on the Board's part. In Chicago Health
Clubs, as in Frisch's eleven years earlier, the court used the classic sub-
stantial evidence standard. Yet, in Chicago Health Clubs, the court
appeared to recognize the Supreme Court's recent admonition that in
unit determinations the Board must be accorded deference as the more
expert tribunal.
It is easy to understand the court's reasoning in Chicago Health
Clubs when confronted with Board opinions that are inconsistent, ill-
103. Id. at 336-37.
104. Id. at 337-38. The court stated that "eighteen percent of all employees were transferred
permanently among the Chicago stores [and a]dditional testimony showed that temporary trans-
fers frequently occur, almost on a daily basis." (Footnote omitted). Id. at 338.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 339 (citing NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966)).
107. Id. at 338.
108. Id. at 339.
109. Id. at 339-40.
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reasoned, and which, instead of using legal analysis, are peppered with
legal conclusions containing ritualistic language required by the Act.
As noted by Professor Gorman:
Perhaps the three most significant factors in the Board's unit determi-
nations in retail chain-store cases are the degree of local managerial
independence. . . the geographic proximity of the stores within the
proposed unit. . . and the degree of employee interchange among
the included and excluded stores. However, there is no sure way to
determine how the Board will apply these criteria. In any given
case, the Board's analysis is likely to be conclusory, with quantitative
labels such as "substantial" or "mere" appended without elabora-
tion; and in different cases, there is quite often inconsistency in the
Board's use of any one of the three fundamental criteria."10
Circuit court panels which strictly construe their function under
the Supreme Court's admonition in South Prarie Construction Co. v.
Local 627, International Union of Operating Engineers' I I apply only the
abuse of discretion standard. Panels, like Chicago Health Clubs, which
are more dubious when confronted with the Board's expertise, apply
the more usual substantial evidence standard in viewing the record as a
whole.1 2 Thus, the distinctions relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in
the cases discussed have granted or denied enforcement of Board unit
determinations by shifting considerations of the scope of review. Al-
l 10. R. GORMAN, supra note 65, at 78-79.
111. 425 U.S. 800, 805 (1976). See note 90, supra.
112. The problem in these cases may really be with the Board and its unnecessary use of the
concept of presumptions in ascertaining what constitutes an appropriate unit for bargaining. As
noted in C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342 (2d ed. 1972):
One ventures the assertion that "presumption" is the slipperiest member of the family of
legal terms, except its first cousin, "burden of proof." One author has listed no less than
eight senses in which the term has been used by the courts. Agreement can probably be
secured to this extent, however a presumption is a standardized practice, under which
certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of
other facts.
According to the Board's procedures, in unit determinations, the only evidentiary hearing is non-
adversary so that the actual burden and responsibility is on the Board itself as expert, neutral
factfinder. See NLRB STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE 29 C.F.R. § 101.20(c) (1977). How can a
concept developed in the trial court setting and dealing with allocating burdens of proof and
persuasion be useful in this context? Actually, the Board when discussing presumptions of appro-
priateness, is obviously not utilizing a presumption at all, but merely the language of presump-
tions.
This use by the Board of inappropriate and confusing legal langauge causes problems for
both the practitioner and the reviewing court. The practioner's problem is in knowing how much
evidence rebuts the Board's presumption of appropriateness or persuades the Board of a single
unit's appropriateness again after rebuttal. Under the present system, the non-adversary hearing
structure affords the practitioner no possible glimpse into when he or she has presented sufficient
evidence to prove the unit's appropriateness. Similarly, those advocates attempting to disprove
the appropriateness of the bargaining unit also have difficulty determining the Board's standard of
when they have disproven the unit's appropriateness. In like manner, the reviewing court's prob-
lem is that it must determine whether the Board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or based on
substantial evidence. The Board's complicated decisional language obscures what ought to be a
simple question--that is, whether or not there is evidence on the record to sustain the Board's
determination of appropriateness.
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though review is possible under arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discre-
tion standards," 3  reversal of Board action by the "substantial
evidence" standard set forth in section 10(e) of the Act" 4 is obviously
much easier. Thus, the imposition of "substantial evidence" review by
the court in Chicago Health Clubs allowed rejection of the Board's de-
termination.
The utilization of the broader scope of review language in Chicago
Health Clubs appears to be no accident. The court leaned in this di-
rection because it was confronted with Board action which the court
believed did not conform to the evidence presented at the initial adju-
dication. Implicit in this action is the court's insistence on carefully
culling Board determinations in representation matters despite the
court's lipservice to the recent Supreme Court suggestion that review-
ing courts should look only for real abuse of discretion on the Board's
part. Thus, the differing conclusions achieved in Walgreen and Chi-
cago Health Clubs do not reflect mere differences of result but com-
pletely different concepts of judicial control of the Board's expert
administrative actions in representation cases.
RECOGNITIONAL PICKETING PROHIBITED BY NON-GUARD UNIONS
AGAINST ARMORED-CAR EMPLOYERS
This term, the Seventh Circuit also considered the issue of whether
recognitional picketing subsequent to a Board determination that it
cannot or will not hold a representation election constitutes an unfair
labor practice in violation of section 8(b)(7)(c) of the Act." 5  In Inter-
113. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
114. National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). This section provides,
in pertinent part:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or
if all the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district
court of the United States, within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair
labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business,
for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order, and shall file in the court the record in the proceedings, as provided in section
2112 of the title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding
and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary
relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter a decree
enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its
member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglectto urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The
findings of the Board with respect to questions of facts if supported by subsiantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. (Emphasis added).
115. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976) provides, in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recog-
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national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 344 v. NLRB (Purolator Se-
curity) ,116 the union filed a representation petition seeking an election
for a unit of employees of Purolator Security, Inc. The regional direc-
tor dismissed the petition relying on section 9(b)(3) of the Act." 17 The
Board agreed with the regional director that the petition must be dis-
missed because the employees in question were "guards."' 1 8 Since the
Board decided that a unit of "driver-guards" could not be represented
by a labor organization also representing non-guard employees, it con-
cluded that the union was forbidden from engaging in recognitional
picketing. "19
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding of the Board. 20 First, it
noted that the Board has considered armored-car drivers to be
"guards" since 1953 when the Board decided Armored Motored Service
Co.' 2 1 The court noted that the Board has based its findings that ar-
mored-car drivers are guards on "general concern for the problem of
divided loyalties in employees primarily responsible for the protection
of the employer's property."'' 22 The Board's position has been that the
divided loyalty problem is present in the case of armored-car guards,
albeit to a lesser extent than in the instance of plant-guards. The court
found support in both the language of the Act and its legislative history
for the Board's view. 123 Moreover, the court found persuasive the
Board-cited example of possible disloyalty when such guards might be
asked to deliver money or valuables through a picket line of one of the
armored-car service's customers whose employees were represented by
nize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employ-
ees.. .
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
159(c) of this title. . . . [Act § 9(c)].
116. 568 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1977).
117. Id. at 14. National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976) provides in
part:
The Board shall decide in each case ...in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining ...Provided, That the Board shall not ...
(3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with
other employees, any individual employed as a guard-to enforce against employees and
other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons
on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representa-
tive of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to member-
ship, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to
membership, employees other than guards. (Emphasis aided).
118. 568 F.2d at 14.
119. Id. at 15.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Armored Motor Service Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1139, 32 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1953)).
122. Id. at 16.
123. Id.
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the same union as that representing the armored-car guards.1 24 The
court noted that the Board's theory was accepted last year by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Local 71, Teamsters v. NLRB (Wells
Fargo). 125
Having concluded that the armored-car employees could reason-
ably be viewed by the Board as guards under the Act, the court rejected
the union's contention that even if the Board could not certify the
union as the representative of the unit, it nevertheless should have held
an election for the employees in the unit and certified the arithmetical
results. The union had contended that if such an election had been
held, and if a majority of the employees had voted for the union, its
recognitional picketing would not have been an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b)(7)(c). The court held that the Board was not re-
quired to hold an election, and therefore refused to consider whether
the union's theory was correct.
26
The court found that the Act barred recognitional picketing after a
determination that no Board-conducted election would be held. Dis-
tinguishing several earlier decisions by other courts, 2 7 the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the union argument that it should be able to employ
economic pressure to obtain majority status, even though the union has
not been afforded the opportunity to use the Board's representation
election procedures. The court agreed with the District of Columbia
Circuit position128 that the limitation on recognitional picketing as ex-
pressed in section 8(b)(7)(c) appears to contemplate recognitional pick-
eting only as a prelude to a Board election. Thus, the court found that
absent the possiblity of an election, recognitional picketing would con-
stitute an unfair labor practice which the Board may enjoin.'
29
Finally, the court recognized that two policies crucial to the recog-
nitional picketing prohibition set forth in the Act are implemented by
refusing to allow union picketing without the possibility of a Board-
conducted election. The first is a policy favoring orderly settlement of
labor disputes--the opposite conclusion would allow representational
picketing for a potentially indefinite period of time. The second is that
124. Id.
125. 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
126. 568 F.2d at 17.
127. The cases distinguished in 568 F.2d at 17-18 nn. 10-12 were: United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Rock-Hills-Uris, Inc. v. McLeod, 236 F. Supp.
395 (S.D. N.Y. 1964), aff-dper curiam, 344 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1965); Vila Barr, 157 N.L.R.B. 588,
61 L.R.R.M. 1386 (1966).
128. The District of Columbia position is stated in Local 71, Teamsters v. NLRB (Wells
Fargo), 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
129. 568 F.2d at 19.
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the ban on recognitional picketing prevents "the union practice of go-
ing into an employer's office without any concern for the sentiments of
the majority of the employees and threatening to engage in picketing
indefinitely unless the employer recognized the union as the bargaining
representative of the employees."' 130 Thus, the court manifested an
awareness that indefinite recognitional picketing in this context would
open the door to the same types of abuse which the Act was designed to
prevent.13'
The court rejected the union claim that section 8(b)(7)(c) was un-
constitutional as applied in this case and that section 9(b)(3) was un-
constitutional since as interpreted it violated employees' first
amendment right to freedom of association. The court noted:
Balancing the public interest to be served by Section 9(b)(3)
against the minimal infringement on the Union and employee's
rights, we conclude that this provision is plainly Constitutional.
Congress in passing this provision did so in order to avoid conflicting
loyalties in employees deemed to be of particular importance to the
employer ....
As to the degree of infringement caused by this statute, it can
only be characterized as incidental and minimal. Nothing restricts
the guards' right to join the Union, to associate with nonguards or
even to receive voluntary bargaining rights. All that is deprived is
certification and a Board-conducted election. Balanced against the
public policy served by this provision, we find that there is too insub-
stantial an infringement on the Union's and employees' rights to jus-
tify holding this provision to be violative of the Constitution.
132
In Local 71, Teamsters v. NLRB (Wells Fargo),133 the District of
Columbia Circuit similarly rejected the union arguments regarding in-
definite picketing for recognition by unions incapable of being certified
by the Board. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that the union committed an unfair labor
practice by resuming picketing after its representation petition had
been dismissed by the regional director. The court noted that "a
Board-conducted election is a 'costly occasion'" and the Board could
reasonably conclude that non-certifiable unions "should not be allowed
to invoke the Board's processes."' 34 Second, the court held that the
unfair labor practice occurred after the Board's dismissal of the election
petition, when there was no reasonable prospect of achieving a Board-
conducted election. The court reasoned that "[tlo tolerate continued
130. Id. at 18.
131. Id. at 19.
132. Id. at 18.
133. 553 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cit. 1977).
134. Id. at 1376 (quoting Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99 (1954)).
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picketing after dismissal of the Union's petition would bestow on peti-
tioner greater rights than are afforded qualifying unions."' 3 5
Thus, two circuit courts of appeals have rejected recognitional
picketing against armored-car services by a union that cannot be certi-
fied under the Act. Both opinions are well-reasoned and appear to
authoritatively sustain the Board in enjoining recognitional picketing
which could be of indefinite duration.
IN-PLANT CAFETERIA SERVICES AS MANDATORY SUBJECTS OF
BARGAINING
One of the major requirements of the Act is that employers and
unions bargain in good faith' 36-as that term has been defined for
more than forty years of close analysis and development by both the
Board and the courts.37 The duty to bargain in good faith is imposed
on both the employer and the representative of his employees by sec-
tion 8(d) of the Act;'38 the refusal to bargain is made an unfair labor
practice by sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3),139 and any refusal to discuss
"mandatory subjects of collective bargaining" is a per se violation of
the Act.140 This obviously requires a finding of whether or not a par-
ticular item on which a charge is based is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, which in turn is dependent on the determination of whether a
particular item is deemed to be embraced by the phrase "wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment" contained in section
8(d). Determining what specific items are encompassed by the term
"conditions of employment" has been an extremely troublesome task
for the Board and the courts.
135. Id. at 1377.
136. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) provides that:
To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,. . . but
such oblgation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession ....
137. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736
(1962); General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 57 L.R.R.M. 1491 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 28
L.R.R.M. 1608 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); and
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 28 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1952).
138. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
139. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... National Labor Relations
Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(b)(3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents to "refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a) [29
U.S.C. § 159(a)]." National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976).
140. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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One facet of this problem is whether in-plant meals and food serv-
ices are such a sufficiently integral part of the employment relationship
that they constitute a "condition of employment."' 4' In four recent
decisions, 42 the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth
and Seventh Circuits have rejected Board findings 43 that in-plant cafe-
teria and vending machine food services, and the prices charged for the
items sold there, are terms and conditions of employment, and there-
fore mandatory bargaining topics.
In Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,' 44 the Seventh Circuit was again
faced with this issue. The case arose from the auto company's refusal
to bargain with the union regarding an increase in cafeteria and vend-
ing prices and its further refusal to give the union information regard-
ing the vending machine operations, profits from food operations,
control of prices and contractual relations by Ford Motor Company
with the outside caterer who had actually supplied the in-plant food
services. The union and the company had bargained over various as-
pects of the quality of service provided by the caterer for nearly a dec-
ade, but the company had consistently refused to bargain concerning
prices set by the outside caterer. 1
45
Based on the employer's refusal to divulge the requested informa-
tion and its further refusal to negotiate, the union filed charges with the
Board. At the administrative hearing level, the administrative law
judge dismissed the complaint against the employer, reasoning that
since the courts had consistently reversed the Board's findings that in-
plant meals present mandatory topics for bargaining, and that the
Board had failed to seek certiorari from the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Ladish,146 the Board had acquiesced in this result. 47 The Board re-
jected this deduction, stating that "[w]ith all due respect to the First,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, we adhere to our position that cafeteria
141. See Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672, 25 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1949). See also
Herman Sausage Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 168,43 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1958), enforced, 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.
1960).
142. NLRB v. Ladish, 538 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Package Mach. Co., 457 F.2d
936 (1st Cir. 1972); McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc), rev'g Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB,
369 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966).
143. The respective Board cases were as follows: Ladish Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 354, 89 L.R.R.M.
1653 (1975); Package Mach. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 268, 77 L.R.R.M. 1456 (1971); McCall Corp., 172
N.L.R.B. 540, 69 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1968); and Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1080, 61
L.R.R.M. 1165 (1966).
144. 571 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1978).
145. Id. at 995-96, 996 n.3.
146. 538 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'g 219 N.L.R.B. 354, 89 L.R.R.M. 1653 (1975).
147. 571 F.2d at 996.
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and vending machine prices are a mandatory subject of bargaining."'148
It was in this context that the issue in Ford was presented to the
Seventh Circuit. Under the facts of the case, the court concurred with
the Board in its determination that the in-plant food service price struc-
ture was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In so deciding, the court presented a cogent analysis of the state of
the law with reference to the nature and scope of bargaining. The Sev-
enth Circuit's analysis centers around its interpretation of Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 49 the major Supreme Court decision
defining the scope of bargaining duty. Essentially, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's perception is that the Supreme Court in Fibreboard stressed the
particular facts of the case in holding that sub-contracting constituted a
mandatory subject for bargaining even in the absence of any evidence
of employer anti-union motivation in its determination to sub-contract
work. In the Ford opinion, the court viewed the majority opinion in
Fibreboard as having achieved an extermely limited holding.
Attention to the particular facts in Fibreboard seems to require a
case-by-case approach to any determination of the scope of mandatory
bargaining. The Seventh Circuit stated that the scope of bargaining
issues are to be decided as questions of fact by the Board as the expert
agency, and not as questions of law, and that this seems to have been
neglected or overlooked in cases subsequent to Fibreboard.150
A second requirement of Fibreboard is that the standard to be ap-
plied to the facts by the Board and the reviewing court alike is whether
a particular matter affects or has an impact upon a term or condition of
employment.' 5' Hence, in Ford, the Seventh Circuit articulated the
standard to be applied in mandatory bargaining cases as a two-pronged
approach. First, the determination is a question of fact, to be decided
on the particular facts and on a case-by-case basis. Second, whenever
148. 230 N.L.R.B. 716, 717, 95 L.R.R.M. 1397, 1399 (1977) (footnote omitted).
149. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
150. 571 F.2d at 997. The Seventh Circuit pointed out that this emphasis on the importance
of a case-by-case approach is especially well-articulated in Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 379 U.S. at 218.
151. In Ford Motor Co., the Seventh Circuit stated that the "Fibreboard opinion goes to great
pains to emphasize that each categorization of what is or is not a term or condition of employment
or what has or has not sufficient effect or impact upon a term or condition so as to convert it into a
mandatory subject of bargaining, must depend on the facts .... 571 F.2d at 997.
In explaining the use of the effect-impact test, the court stated:
mhe courts of appeals have sought to further develop the standard for determining
whether a particular matter "affects" or "has an impact upon" a term or condition of
employment. Some courts have limited the "effect-impact" test by requiring a "material"
or significant" effect or impact . or a "substantial adverse effect' upon the employ-
ees . .
Id. at 998 (citations and footnote omitted).
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the issue is close, the legal standard to be applied is the "effect-impact"
test.
In Ford, the court distinguished several cases on their facts.
Those cases were Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 152 McCall
Corp. v. NLRB, 53 Package Machinery v. NLRB 154 and NLRB v. Lad-
ish Co.' 55 In Westinghouse, the Fourth Circuit initially rejected the
Board's position that an increase of one cent per cup of coffee served in
the company cafeteria by an independent caterer was a mandatory sub-
ject for bargaining. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed both its own panel and the Board 5 6 in finding that "it was not
the intent of Congress in enacting the National Labor Relations Act to
sweep every act by every employer within the ambit of 'conditions of
employment.' '157
In McCall Corp. v. NLRB, 158 the Fourth Circuit again denied the
Board determination that in-plant food services came within conditions
of employment. The Board had found that the employer supplied the
food at the plant, and fixed the prices at which the food was dis-
pensed.159 The court reversed this decision, holding that the plant was
not so isolated that employees were dependent on food solely in vend-
ing machines, since the employees could bring their lunches from
home. 160 Therefore, food prices were not a condition of employment.
The First Circuit, in NLRB v. Package Machinery,'61 similarly re-
jected the Board's stance that in-plant food services are within the
terms and conditions of the working environment. Here, the court
noted that only fifty per cent of the employees patronized the company
cafeteria, and that there were several restaurants or cafeterias within a
five-minute drive of the plant. Hence, the court reversed the Board's
order that the company bargain with the employee representative over
the extent the company should subsidize the food prices.
162
152. 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967).
153. 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970).
154. 457 F.2d 936 (Ist Cir. 1972).
155. 538 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1976).
156. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967) (en bane), rev'g West-
inghonse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966).
157. 387 F.2d at 550. The court further stated: "The dissenting members of the Board pointed
out, in effect, that equating the trifles here involved with subjects such as wages, hours, working
conditions, job security, pensions, insurance, choice of bargaining representatives or other subjects
directly and materially effecting 'conditions of employment' is sheer nonsense." Id.
158. 432 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1970).
159. McCall Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. 540, 69 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1968).
160. 432 F.2d at 188.
161. 457 F.2d 936 (ist Cir. 1972).
162. Id. at 937.
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In NLRB v. Ladish,163 decided in 1976, the Seventh Circuit denied
enforcement of a Board order to bargain over vending machine prices.
The court emphasized the lack of employer control over prices-prices
which were established by the third-party caterer who owned and oper-
ated the vending machines located on the employer's premises.' 64
That the Seventh Circuit distinguished these cases on their facts is
consistent with the court's most recent approach demonstrated in the
area of mandatory bargaining. However, the reviewing courts' consis-
tent rejection of Board action prior to Ford, had begun to develop suffi-
cient precedential force to take the determination away from the Board
as a matter of law. Certainly, the administrative law judge who ini-
tially dismissed the complaint in Ford thought this to be So. 1 6 5 Hence,
the careful analysis and emphasis on the case-by-case approach in Ford
must be seen to denote a variation in emphasis from the perceived di-
rection of the other recent court decisions.
Implicit in the discussion in Ford is the court's recognition that the
decisions as to what particular items constitute "other terms and condi-
tions of employment" are matters of fact and not of law. This view
does seem to comport with the reasoning expressed by both the major-
ity and the concurrence in Fibreboard. Certainly the limited nature of
that holding is indicated by the following language expressed in the
majority opinion:
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to
hold, as we do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved in
this case-the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining
unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment-is a statutory subject of
collective bargaining under Section 8(d). Our decision need not and
does not encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcon-
tracting" which arise daily in our complex economy.' 66
The Seventh Circuit's flexible construction and case-by-case ap-
proach as exemplified by Ford thus would seem consistent with- the
approach suggested by Fibreboard. An effect-impact analysis allows
the court to avoid forcing bargaining for unimportant trifles. By reas-
serting the primacy of questions of fact in these cases, the court has
tipped the balance in favor of the Board, deference therefore must be
paid to the Board's expertise. The particular result in Ford is not of
great significance; in-plant food price and quality is not of concern be-
yond the company gate. However, the mode of analysis and the stand-
163. 538 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1976).
164. Id.
165. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d at 996.
166. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
LABOR LAW
ards set forth reinforce the Board's traditional role in determining what
topics must be dealt with in bargaining among employers and repre-
sentatives of their employees. On balance, the Fibreboard approach,
as clarified in Ford, seems a correct one.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey has focused on five recent decisions of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In three of these cases, the
court considered what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit in the
troublesome areas of health care institutions, non-profit private colleges
and universities, and retail chain stores. The fourth concerns whether
a union commits an unfair labor practice under the Act when it pickets
an armored-car service after the Board has determined that the union
cannot be certified as a bargaining agent under the Act. The court
supported the National Labor Relations Board's theory that such ac-
tion constitutes an unfair labor practice under the Act. In the last case
surveyed, the court approved a Board holding that in-plant meals are
mandatory topics of bargaining between an employer and the chosen
representative of its employees.
The Seventh Circuit has chosen to rule on the propriety of Board
actions in four of the five cases surveyed based on a sensitive concern
for its relationship to the expert agency involved, the National Labor
Relations Board. The court seems acutely aware of its limited function
of review pursuant to the scheme of the Act. However, as noted above,
the Seventh Circuit's view in the one area of hospital unit determina-
tion is not properly cognizant of the Board's expert role. Perhaps this
is due to the Board's own fumbling and inconsistency in this newly-
assigned sector of labor relations. The shifting explanations and con-
tradictory results advanced by the Board and the courts make the de-
velopment of careful, finely drawn precedent in the health care field a
problem for the future, perhaps only to be settled by further Supreme
Court explication.'
67
167. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 98 S. Ct. 2463 (1978).

